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Abstract
Security issues play an important role in almost all modern communication and com-
puter networks. As Internet applications continue to grow dramatically, security
requirements have to be strengthened. Hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems (HECC)
allow for shorter operands at the same level of security than other public-key cryp-
tosystems, such as RSA or Die-Hellman. These shorter operands appear promising
for many applications.
Hyperelliptic curves are a generalization of elliptic curves and they can also be
used for building discrete logarithm public-key schemes. A major part of this work
is the development of computer architectures for the dierent algorithms needed for
HECC. The architectures are developed for a recongurable platform based on Field
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). FPGAs combine the flexibility of software
solutions with the security of traditional hardware implementations. In particular, it
is possible to easily change all algorithm parameters such as curve coecients and
underlying nite eld.
In this work we rst summarized the theoretical background of hyperelliptic
curve cryptosystems. In order to realize the operation addition and doubling on
iii
the Jacobian, we developed architectures for the composition and reduction step.
These in turn are based on architectures for arithmetic in the underlying eld and for
arithmetic in the polynomial ring. The architectures are described in VHDL (VHSIC
Hardware Description Language) and the code was functionally veried. Some of the
arithmetic modules were also synthesized. We provide estimates for the clock cycle
count for a group operation in the Jacobian. The system targeted was HECC of genus
four over GF(241).
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Security issues play an important role in almost all communication and computer net-
works today. As the Internet, and applications such as PDAs, cell phones etc. become
increasingly popular, security requirements have to be strengthened. Cryptography
is the art and science of keeping messages secure. Using dierent algorithms and
protocols we can ensure the integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation of messages
and users. One group of cryptographic algorithms is based on the Discrete Logarithm
(DL) problem.
The Digital Signature Standard (DSA) and the Die-Hellman Key exchange,
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are two examples of protocols based on the DL problem. Traditionally, they have been
realized with the DL problem constructed in a nite eld. More recently, variants
of these protocols based on the elliptic curve DL problem have become popular.
This thesis deals with a generalization of elliptic curve cryptosystems, namely with
schemes based on hyperelliptic curves. The reason why these variants exist is that
DL protocols only requires a nite Abelian group, with subgroup of suciently large
prime order. Such a group is potentially suited for cryptographic applications if the
DL problem is hard and the group operation is computationally easy to perform.
In 1989, Koblitz suggested for the rst time at Crypto ’88 the use of hyperellip-
tic curves (HEC) for discrete log cryptosystems [Kob89a]. HEC are a special class of
algebraic curves and can be viewed as a generalization of elliptic curves. A hyperellip-
tic curve of genus g = 1 is an elliptic curve. Consequently, the theory of hyperelliptic
curves has received increased attention among the cryptography community in recent
years. HECC have the advantage that we can use shorter operand lengths compared
to RSA or traditional DL systems without compromising the security. In practice,
operand lengths between 50 { 80 bits (depending on the genus) can lead to cryptosys-
tems that withstand currently known attacks. In terms of implementation, there are
some publications [SS00, Eng99, SSI98, SS98, Kri97] that deal with the theoretical
analysis of the algorithms, and a few that describe actual software implementations
([SS00, Eng99, SSI98, SS98, Kri97]).
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We chose recongurable hardware technology to implement the cryptosystem
mentioned above. Such hardware devices can accommodate large digital designs with
performances suitable for many high speed applications. One reason why we can gain
high performance is that we specify the underlying eld arithmetic by xing the eld
order and irreducible polynomial. FPGAs allow us instance-specic architectures.
Recongurable devices are attractive for cryptographic applications because
we can modify the algorithm. Virtually all parameters of the design can be altered.
In the case of HECC, parameters that could be varied include curve coecients,
underlying nite eld order and irreducible polynomial, genus, and algorithms used
in the group operation.
Hence, implementations based on recongurable hardware preserve much of
the flexibility of software solutions while providing much of the security, speed, com-
pactness, and aordability of a hardware solution. The most recent recongurable
computing ICs bring the possibility of full-size cryptographic implementations in real-
world applications.
The work in this thesis deals with architectures for a HECC. First we sum-
marized the theoretical background of hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems. In order
to realize the operation addition and doubling on the Jacobian, we developed ar-
chitectures for the composition and reduction step. These, in turn, are based on
architectures for arithmetic in the underlying eld and for arithmetic in the polyno-
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mial ring. The architectures are described in VHDL (VHSIC Hardware Description
Language) and the code was functionally veried. Some of the arithmetic modules
were also synthesized. We provide estimates for the clock cycle count for a group
operation in the Jacobian. The system targeted was a HECC of genus four over
GF(241). At the time of writing we are not aware of any other documented eort in
this particular area.
1.2 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2 we introduce the basic denitions and properties of hyperelliptic curves
(HEC). We also introduced divisors and dierent groups of divisors. After these
denitions we are able to dene the Jacobian of the HEC. We conclude chapter 2 with
a polynomial representation of the equivalent classes and algorithms for addition and
doubling of two elements.
Chapter 3 summarizes the previous work on HECC and is divided into two
sections. The rst section covers all publications dealing with implementations of
HECC and the second section deals with selected issues that are important for the
implementation of HECC in hardware.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 deal with the architectures and algorithms of HECC in
hardware. Chapter 4 presents the way the eld operations and polynomial opera-
Introduction 5
tions are implemented. Each subsection describes the algorithm and methods used to
implement the dierent modules of the design. Chapter 5 covers the design method-
ology including the design cycle, the target FPGA and the design tools, as well as the
generation of random divisors. Chapter 6 describes the implementation of group addi-
tion and doubling on the target FPGA. This chapter closes with the results achieved
in the implementation. The last chapter covers a discussion of further research and
conclusions.
Chapter 2
Mathematical Background:
Properties of Hyperelliptic Curves
relevant to Cryptography
The idea that Jacobians groups of hyperelliptic curves (HEC) are suitable for discrete
logarithm cryptosystems was rst introduced at Crypto ‘88 by Neal Koblitz [Kob89a].
In this chapter we present an elementary introduction to some of the theory of hy-
perelliptic curves over nite elds of arbitrary characteristic, restricting attention to
material that has cryptographic relevance. Algorithms for adding (e.g., Cantor‘s al-
gorithm [Can87]) and doubling in the Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve are presented.
Hyperelliptic curves are a special class of algebraic curves and can be viewed as gen-
6
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eralizations of elliptic curves. There are hyperelliptic curves of every genus g  1. A
hyperelliptic curve of genus g = 1 is the same as an elliptic curve.
Most of the proofs and details about HEC can be found in [Kob98, Kob89a,
Kob89b, BSS99]. For an introduction to algebraic geometry the reader should consult
[Ful69].
2.1 Denitions and Basic Properties
We will now give the main denitions and properties of hyperelliptic curves and their
Jacobians.
First we dene the algebraic closure:
Denition 2.1.1 [Kob98] If a eld F has the property that every polynomial with co-
ecients in F factors completely into linear factors, then we say that F is algebraically
closed. Equivalently, it suces to require that every polynomial with coecients in F
has a root in F . For instance, the eld C of complex numbers is algebraically closed.
The smallest algebraically closed extension eld of F is called the algebraic closure of
F . It is denoted F and is unique. For example, the algebraic closure of the eld of
real numbers is the eld of complex numbers.
Denition 2.1.2 [Kob98] Let F be a nite eld, and let F be the algebraic closure
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of F . A hyperelliptic curve C of genus g over F (g  1) is the set of solutions
(u; v) 2 F  F to an equation of the form
C : v2 + h(u)v = f(u) in F [u; v]; (2.1)
where h(u) 2 F is a polynomial of degree at most g, f(u) 2 F [u] is a monic polynomial
of degree 2g + 1, and there are no pairs (u; v) 2 F  F which simultaneously satisfy
the equation v2 + h(u)v = f(u) and the partial dierential equations 2v + h(u) = 0
and h0(u)v − f 0(u) = 0.
A singular point on C is a pair (u; v) 2 F  F which simultaneously satises
the equation v2 + h(u)v = f(u) and the partial dierential equations 2y + h(u) = 0
and h0(u)y− f 0(u) = 0. From Denition 2.1.2 we see that hyperelliptic curves do not
have any singular point.
Lemma 2.1.3 [Kob98] Let C be a hyperelliptic curve over F dened by Equation 2.1.
1. If h(u) = 0 then char(F ) 6= 2.
2. If char(F ) 6= 2, then the change of variables u! u; v ! (v−h(u)=2) transforms
C to the form v2 = f(u) where degu f = 2g + 1
3. Let C be an equation of the form (2.1) with h(u) = 0 and char(F ) 6= 2. Then
C is a hyperelliptic curve if and only if f(u) has no repeated roots in F .
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Denition 2.1.4 [Kob98] Let K be an extension eld of F . The set of K -rational
points on C, denoted C(K ), is the set of all points P = (x; y) 2 K  K that satisfy
(2.1), together with a special point at innity denoted 1. The set of points C(F ) will
simply be denoted by C. The points in C other than 1 are called nite points.
Denition 2.1.5 [Kob98] Let P = (x; y) be a nite point on a hyperelliptic curve C.
The opposite point of P is the point P 0 = (x;−y−h(x)). We also dene the opposite
of 1 to be 10 =1 itself. If a nite point P satises P = P 0, then the point is said
to be special; otherwise, the point is said to be ordinary.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show two examples of hyperelliptic curves over the eld
of real numbers. Both curve have genus g = 2 and h(u) = 0. They are dened as
C1 : v2 = u5 + u4 + 4u3 + 4u2 + 3u + 3 = (u + 1)(u2 + 1)(u2 + 3) and C2 : v2 =
u5−5u3 +4u+3 = u(u−1)(u+1)(u−2)(u+2). The graphs of the curves are plotted
over the real plane.
As a motivation for the group operation to be developed in the next section,
let us now attempt to \add" two points on a hyperelliptic curve including the point
of innity using the same method which is used for elliptic curves. Suppose that
P;Q 2 C, and let L be the line connecting P and Q. Bezout’s theorem [Ful69] says
that the intersection of L and C will consist of 2g+1 points (counted with appropriate
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Figure 2.1: Hyperelliptic curve C1 : v2 = u5 + u4 + 4u3 + 4u2 + 3u+ 3 over the reals
multiplicities), so
L \ C = fP;Q;R1; R2; :::; R2g−1g:
This fact can be demonstrated if we intersect C2 with a line L, as shown in Figure 2.3.
C2 has a genus g = 2, therefore we have 2g + 1 = 5 intersection points.
If g = 1, which is the case for an elliptic curve, we get a unique third point,
but when g  2, we obtain multiple points and there is no canonical way to pick a
particular one. It turns out that the solution is to use lists of points, rather than
single points. Abstractly, one considers sets of g points of C, fP1; P2; P3; :::; Pgg, and
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Figure 2.2: Hyperelliptic curve C2 : v2 = u5 − 5u3 + 4u+ 3 over the reals
denes a certain equivalence relation on these sets.
The following section will focus on this relation and will introduce the concept
of divisors which will allow the denition of an addition operation on the Jacobian.
2.2 Divisors
This section presents the basic properties of divisors.
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Figure 2.3: Intersection of Hyperelliptic curve C2 : v2 = u5− 5u3 + 4u+ 3 and Line L
Denition 2.2.1 [Kob98] A divisor is a nite formal sum of F -points, D =
P
miPi.
Its degree is the sum of the coecients
P
mi. If K is an algebraic extension of F , we
say that D is dened over K if for every automorphism  of F that xes K one hasP
miP i = D, where P
 denotes the point obtained by applying  to the coordinates of
P (and 1 =1). The order of D at P is the integer mP ; we write ordP (D) = mP .
Example: Assume we have a hyperelliptic curve C : v2 +uv = u5 +5u4 +
6u2 + u+ 3 over F 7, an example of a divisor is,
D = 2(2; 2) + 3(5; 3) + (1; 1) + (6; 4)
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and the degree of D is
X
mi = 2 + 3 + 1 + 1 = 7:
The set of all divisors, denoted by D , forms an additive group under the addition
rule:
X
P2C
mPP +
X
P2C
nPP =
X
P2C
(mP + nP )P
Let D 0 denote the subgroup consisting of divisors of degree 0.
2.3 Principal Divisors
Before we are able to dene the Jacobian, we have to dene principal divisors. We
will only provide the denitions that are needed for our work. For more details e.g.
on rational functions consult [Kob98, Pages 159 -167] or [Ful69].
Denition 2.3.1 [Kob98] Given a polynomial G(u; v) 2 F [u; v], we can consider
G(u; v) as a function on the curve (equivalently, as an element of the quotient ring
F [u; v]=(v2 + h(u)v − f(u))). From a practical viewpoint, we lower the power of v in
G(u; v) by means of the equation of the curve until we have an expression of the form
G(u; v) = a(u) − b(u)v. We let (G(u; v)) = (PmiPi) − (m1)1 2 D 0 (where the
coecient m1 is chosen so that the divisor has degree 0) denote the divisor of the
Mathematical Background 14
polynomial function G(u; v). The coecient mi is the \order of vanishing" of G(u,v)
at the point Pi.
Denition 2.3.2 [Kob98] A divisor of the form (G(u; v)) − (H(u; v)) is called a
principal divisor. That is, the divisor of the rational function G(u; v)=H(u; v).
The principal divisor (G(u; v))− (H(u; v)) is supported on the zeros and poles
of the function G(u; v)=H(u; v), where the zeros are assigned positive coecients and
the poles are assigned negative coecient. The set of all rational divisors is denoted
as P . P is a subgroup of D 0, because the degree vanishes.
Example: In order to get a better understanding of Denition 2.3.2, let’s
take an example where we assume that the curve C = R as denoted in
Figure 2.4.
0 1 2 3-1-2-3
"point of
infinity"
P(-2,0)
Q(-1,0) R(1,0) S(3,0)
Figure 2.4: Example for principal divisor where C = R
Let G(x) = (x− 1)(x+ 2)2 and H(x) = (x+ 1)(x− 3)4. That means that
our divisor D = (f(x)) = (G(x))−(H(x)) = 2P −Q+R−4S+21 where
f(x) = (x−1)(x+2)
2
(x+1)(x−3)4 . It can be seen that ordQ(D) = −1 and ordS(D) = −4,
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where Q and S are poles of f(x) and therefore they have negative sign.
Whereas the points P with ordP (D) = 2 and R with ordR(D) = 1 are
zeros and therefore have positive sign.
2.4 The Jacobian J
Using D 0 and P we can dene the Jacobian.
Denition 2.4.1 [Kob98] Let J (more precisely, J(K ), where K is a eld containing
F ) denote the quotient of the group D 0 of divisors of degree zero dened over K by
the subgroup P of principal divisors coming from G;H 2 K [u; v]. J = D 0=P is called
the Jacobian of the curve. If D1; D2 2 D 0 then write D1  D2 if D1 −D2 2 P ; D1
and D2 are said to be equivalent divisors.
Hence, the Jacobian is a nite quotient group of one innite group by another
innite group. Every element on the Jacobian is an equivalence class of divisors.
In order to set up computations on J one needs a unique and \easy" way to
describe equivalence classes of D 0 modulo P ; i.e. we need a convenient set of coset
representatives. In the case of hyperelliptic curves, every element of J can be uniquely
represented. We also need a way to add two elements of J. In the next section we
take a closer look at the unique representation of elements in the Jacobian group.
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The addition rules are stated in Section 2.6.
2.5 Element Representation of the Jacobian
Our rst goal is it to nd a unique and \easy" representation of the equivalence classes
of J.
Let us consider a divisor of degree 0. This divisor can be written as D =P
miPi −
P
mi

1, with Pi = (xi; yi) and Pi 6= Pj where i 6= j.
Denition 2.5.1 [Kob98] Let D =
P
miPi be a divisor. The support of D is the set
supp(D) = fPi 2 C j mi 6= 0g
Denition 2.5.2 [Kob98] A semi-reduced divisor is a divisor of the formD =
P
miPi−
(
P
mi) 1 where each mi  0 and the Pi’s are nite points such that when Pi 2
supp(D) then P 0i =2 supp(D), unless Pi = P 0i , in which case mi = 1
The following lemma shows that each element D in D 0 there exists a semi-
reduced divisor D1 equivalent to D:
Lemma 2.5.3 [Kob98] For each divisor D 2 D 0 there exists a semi-reduced divisor
D1 2 D 0 such that D  D1.
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Note that semi-reduced divisors are not unique in their equivalence class. In
the case of hyperelliptic curves, one can show (either using the Rieman-Roch theorem,
see [Ful69], or in a more elementary way as in the Appendix of [Kob98]) that every
element of J can be uniquely represented by a so-called reduced divisor. The reduced
divisors are dened as follows.
Denition 2.5.4 [Kob98] Let D =
P
miPi − (
P
mi)1 be a semi-reduced divisor.
If
P
mi  g (g is the genus of C) then D is called a reduced divisor.
Hence, a divisor D =
P
miPi − (
P
mi)1 2 D 0 is said to be reduced if:
1. All of the mi are non-negative, and mi  1 if Pi is equal to its opposite.
2. If Pi 6= P 0i , then Pi and P 0i do not both occur in the sum.
3.
P
mi  g.
Now we have a unique representation of all elements in the Jacobian group.
From an implementation point of view it is not very easy to work with divisors.
Therefore the remainder of this section shows an alternative representation of the
divisors.
Semi-reduced divisors can be described as a pair of polynomials as in the
following theorem:
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Theorem 2.5.5 Let D =
P
miPi− (
P
mi)1 be a semi-reduced divisor, where Pi =
(xi; yi). Let a(u) =
Q
(u − xi)mi. There exists a unique polynomial b(u) satisfying:
1) degub < degua; 2) b(xi) = yi for all i for which mi 6= 0; 3) a(u) divides (b(u)2 +
b(u)h(u)− f(u)).
Notation: Divisor D =
P
miPi − (
P
mi)1 represented by a pair of polyno-
mials a(u) and b(u) will be abbreviated as div(a; b).
Now we have an alternative representation for semi-reduced divisors, but as
discussed above, each element of J can be represented uniquely by a reduced divisor.
A reduced divisor is a semi-reduced divisor but of degree less than or equal to g.
Hence the polynomial a is of degree less than or equal to g.
As a conclusion of this section and for better understanding of Theorem 2.5.5
let us look at an example:
Example: Consider the hyperelliptic curve C : v2 + (u2 + u)v = u5 +
u3 + 1 of genus g = 2 over the nite eld F 25 dened with the primitive
polynomial P (x) = x5 + x2 + 1, and let P () = 0. Let P1 = (30; 0) and
P2 = (0; 1) be two points on the curve. Let’s now compute the polynomial
representation of D = P1 + P2 − 21 = div(a; b). As shown in Theorem
2.5.5 a(u) is calculated as a(u) =
Q
(u − xi)mi. It follows that a(u) =
(u+30)(u+0) = (u+30)u. In order to be able to calculate the polynomial
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b(u) we have to nd b(xi) = yi for all i for which mi 6= 0. Hence we get
two equations with two variables: b(x1) = y1 = 0 = cx1 +d = c30 +d and
b(x2) = y2 = 1 = cx2 +d = c 0+d. From the second equation we nd d =
1. Now we compute the inverse of 30 modulo the primitive polynomial
P (x) = x5 + x2 + 1: [30]−1 =  mod P (x). With the knowledge of the
inverse we can easily nd c = . Hence we get b(u) = u + 1. With
Theorem 2.5.5 we are able to nd the polynomial representation of the
given semi-reduced divisor: div(a; b) = (u2+30u; u+1). We see that the
degree of a(u) is equal to g and therefore the polynomial representation
we found is also the representation for the reduced divisor.
2.6 Addition and Doubling over J
The addition D1 +D2 of two divisors D1 and D2 will be calculated in two steps:
 Composition Step: First we have to nd a semi-reduced divisorD0 = div(a0; b0),
such that D0 is equivalent to D1 +D2 = div(a1; b1) + div(a2; b2) in the group J
(Algorithm 2.6.1).
 Reduction Step: Secondly we have to reduce the semi-reduced divisor
D0 = div (a0; b0) to an equivalent reduced divisor D = (a; b) (Algorithms 2.6.3
and 2.6.4).
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A more extensive treatment of these algorithms can be found in [Can87, Eng99, SS98,
SSI98].
2.6.1 Composition Step
Algorithm 2.6.1 describes the Composition Step and was published by Cantor in 1987
[Can87].
Algorithm 2.6.1
Input: Reduced divisors D1 = div(a1; b1) and D2 = div(a2; b2), both dened over F
Output: A semi-reduced divisor D0 = div(a0; b0) dened over F such that
D0  D1 + D2
1. Use the Euclidean algorithm to nd polynomials d1; e1; e1 2 F [u] where
d1 = gcd(a1; a2) and d1 = e1a1 + e2a2
2. Use the Euclidean algorithm to nd polynomials d; c1; c2 2 F [u] where
d = gcd(d1; b1 + b2 + h) and d = c1d1 + c2(b1 + b2 + h)
3. Let s1 = c1e1, s2 = c1e2, and s3 = c2, such that d = s1a1 +s2a2 +s3(b1 +b2 +h)
4. Set
a0 = a1a2=d2
and
Mathematical Background 21
b0 = s1a1b2+s2a2b1+s3(b1b2+f)
d
(moda)
Remark: The steps 1 to 3 of the algorithm can be written as a calculation of the
gcd of three polynomials d = gcd(a1; a2; b1 + b2 + h) = s1a1 + s2a2 + s3(b1 + b2 + h).
The proof that D = div(a; b) is a semi-reduced divisor and that D  D1 + D2
can be found in [Ful69].
If we want to double a divisor the operation is easier. Doubling means that
a = a1 = a2 and b = b1 = b2.
Algorithm 2.6.2
Input: Reduced divisors D = div(a; b) dened over F
Output: A semi-reduced divisor D0 = div(a0; b0) dened over F such that
D0  D + D
1. Use the Euclidean algorithm to nd polynomials d; s1; s3 2 F [u] where
d = gcd(a; b2 + h) and d = s1a+ s3(b2 + h)
2. Set
a0 = a2=d2
and
b0 = s1ab+s3(b
2+f)
d
(moda)
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2.6.2 Reduction Step
To complete the addition, we must nd a unique reduced divisor D = div(a; b). There
are two algorithms that are used for the reduction step: Gauss reduction and Lagrange
reduction [Eng99]. In the rst algorithm the computation of the ak (where ak is the
value of a in the iteration k of the algorithm) involves one multiplication and one
division of high degree polynomials. Each step is independent of the previous one.
However, as soon as a reduction step has been carried out, the formula for ak can
be rewritten using information from the previous step. Lagrange reduction takes ad-
vantage of this fact. The Lagrange reduction algorithm was published by Paulus and
Stein for hyperelliptic curves over a eld of odd characteristic [PS98]. A generalized
version for arbitrary characteristic was given by Enge in [Eng99]. Algorithm 2.6.3
and 2.6.4 summarizing Gauss and Lagrange reductions, respectively.
Algorithm 2.6.3
Input: A semi-reduced divisor D0 = div(a0; b0) dened over F
Output: The (unique) reduced divisor D = div(a; b) such that D0  D
1. a0 = a0, b0 = b0
2. For k = 1 to t do (where t is minimal such that deg at  g):
2.1 ak =
f−bk−1h−b2k−1
ak−1
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2.2 bk = (−h− bk−1) mod a
3. Output (a ak; b bk)
Algorithm 2.6.4
Input: A semi-reduced divisor D = div(a; b) dened over F
Output: The (unique) reduced divisor D = div(a;b) such that D  D
1. a0 = a, b0 = b
2. a1 =
f−b0h−b20
a0
3. −b0 − h = q1a1 + b1, with deg bk  deg ak
4. For k = 2 To t Do (where t is the minimal such that deg at  g):
4.1 ak = ak−2 + qk−1(bk−1 − bk−2)
4.2 −bk−1 − h = qkak + bk, with deg bk  deg ak
5. Output (a ak;b bk)
Theorem 2.6.5 shows that the gauss algorithm results in a reduced divisor.
Theorem 2.6.5 [Kob98] Let D = div(a; b) be a semi-reduced divisor. Then the
divisor D = div(a; b) returned by Algorithm 2.6.3 is reduced, and D0  D.
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Discrete Log (DL) Problem: The DL Problem on J(K ) is the problem,
given two divisors D1; D2 2 J(K ), of determining an integer m such that D2 = mD1,
if such an m exists.
Security against known attacks: It is currently believed that the best
attacks for curves of genus < 5 are generic square root algorithms, such as Pollard’s
Rho method or the Baby-step Giant-step algorithms. These attacks have a complexity
of O(pp), where p is the largest prime dividing the order of the group.
If the base eld of the curve is a nite eld with cardinality q, then the Jacobian
of the curve is a nite abelian group of order around qg. The Hasse-Weil bound gives
a precise interval for this order: (
p
q − 1)2g  #J(C)  (pq + 1)2g.
Computing Multiples of Divisors: A central ingredient in cryptosystems
based on the DL problem in an Abelian group is an ecient process for computing
mD for D 2 J(K ) and for large integers m.
D ? D ?    ? D| {z }
m times
= mD
This operation is called divisor multiplication or scalar multiplication, and dominates
the execution time of hyperelliptic cryptosystems.
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2.7 Analogy
To summarize this chapter I will try to present an analogy between the computation
in the Jacobian group and more familiar groups Z q. Z q is also a quotient group, like
the Jacobian, and it can be written as Z =qZ . For example let’s take the quotient
group Z =7Z which can also be written as Z 7. If we work in this group we naturally
represent all elements, with a class representative. Let 0; 1; :::6 be the unique class
representatives. Hence, 0 = f:::;−14;−7; 0; 7; 14; :::g, 1 = f:::;−13;−6; 1; 8; 15; :::g,
..., 6 = f:::;−8;−1; 6; 13; 20; :::g.
The principal divisors in the Jacobian group are analogous to the represen-
tatives that we have chosen. To add two elements in Z =7Z , one has to provide two
steps: the addition of two elements and the reduction of the result. That means that
we have to provide the same two steps in order to get the result of an addition, as in
the Jacobian group. For example, suppose we want to add 3 + 5. The result of this
addition is 8. Now we reduce 8  1 mod 7. Thus, we get the equivalent class 1.
Chapter 3
Previous Work
3.1 HECC Implementation
When we look at previous work, there are some papers that describe the implementa-
tion of HECC in a theoretical manner, and other papers where the authors actually
implemented the cryptosystem in software.
In [Eng99] Andreas Enge describes a theoretical analysis of the computational
eciency of arithmetic on hyperelliptic curves. He rst generalizes two reduction
algorithms. In the main part of the paper he analyses the average complexity of
the arithmetic in hyperelliptic Jacobians over any nite eld. He comes up with an
exact average number of eld operations for computing the greatest common divisor
26
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of polynomials over a nite eld using the Extended Euclidean Algorithm. Then he
uses these result to calculate the complexity of addition and doubling in the Jacobian.
multiplication inversions
p 6= 2, g even 17g2 + 5g − 7 + 1
q
O(g3) 3
2
g + 3 + 1
q
O(g2)
p 6= 2, g odd 17g2 + 6g − 4 + 1
q
O(g3) 3
2
g + 7
2
+ 1
q
O(g2)
p = 2, g even 14g2 + 6g − 6 + 1
q
O(g3) 3
2
g + 2 + 1
q
O(g2)
p = 2, g odd 14g2 + 7g − 3 + 1
q
O(g3) 3
2
g + 5
2
+ 1
q
O(g2)
Table 3.1: Number of eld operations for divisor addition [Eng99]
multiplication inversions
p 6= 2, g even 16g2 + 7g − 6 + 1
q
O(g3) 3
2
g + 2 + 1
q
O(g2)
p 6= 2, g odd 16g2 + 8g − 3 + 1
q
O(g3) 3
2
g + 5
2
+ 1
q
O(g2)
p = 2, h = 1, g even 7g2 + 3g − 3 + 1
q
O(g3) 1
2
g + 2 + 1
q
O(g2)
p = 2, h = 1, g odd 7g2 + 4g + 1
q
O(g3) 1
2
g + 5
2
+ 1
q
O(g2)
p = 2, h = X, g even 11g2 + 4g − 3 + 1
q
O(g3) 1
2
g + 3 + 1
q
O(g2)
p = 2, h = X, g odd 11g2 + 5g + 1
q
O(g3) 1
2
g + 7
2
+ 1
q
O(g2)
Table 3.2: Number of eld operations for divisor doubling [Eng99]
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show his results. The rst table states the average
number of eld operations needed to add two distinct divisors. The second table
shows the numbers for eld operations needed to double two divisors. In the two
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tables he distinguishes between even and odd characteristics, and p = 2 and p 6= 2.
He concludes with the suggestion to implement the hyperelliptic cryptosystem in
characteristic 2. He also adds that if the complexity of the eld operations is constant
or grows with log(q), then the smallest possible genus tting the system requirements
should be chosen. If the complexity of the eld operations grow with (log(q))2, a
higher genus might be recommended.
In [Sma99] various aspects of cryptosystems based on hyperelliptic curves are
discussed. In particular, the author analyzes the implementation of the group law on
hyperelliptic curves and how to nd suitable curves for use in cryptography. The paper
presents a practical comparison between the performance of digital signature schemes
based on elliptic curve and schemes based on hyperelliptic curves. He implemented
the group law in the Jacobian for curves of arbitrary genus over F 2n and F p, where
p is prime. The author decided to choose values of p and n such that p and 2n are
less than 232. This choice made sure that the basic arithmetic ts into single words
on the processor. The timings which are reported for a hyperelliptic variant of the
DSA scheme were obtained on a Pentium Pro 334 MHz, running Windows NT, and
using Microsoft Visual C++ compiler. Estimates of the timings for an elliptic curve
system with approximately the same group order are also included. The results are
shown in Table 3.3.
The hyperelliptic curve implementation of genus g = 5 over the eld F 231 took
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Curve Field Sign Verify
HCDSA g=5 F 231 18 ms 71 ms
HCDSA g=6 F 231 26 ms 98 ms
HCDSA g=7 F 231 40 ms 156 ms
ECDSA F 2161 4 ms 19 ms
ECDSA F p 3 ms 17 ms
Table 3.3: HCDSA and ECDSA Timings [Sma99]
18 ms to sign and 71 ms to verify the message. Using curves over the same eld with
g = 6 and g = 7, it took 26 ms and 40 ms to sign, and 98 ms and 156 ms to verify
the message, respectively. The elliptic curve implementation took about 3 to 4 ms
to sign and 17 to 19 ms to verify. It is important to point out that the elliptic curve
implementation made no use of special eld representations such as using the subeld
structure. Smart notes that even though the nite eld elements t into a single
processor-word, the extra cost of the polynomial arithmetic needed for operations in
the Jacobian makes the time needed to perform sign/verify operation on the HECC
over four times slower than in the elliptic curve case. If more ecient elliptic curve
techniques had been used, the relative performance of the hyperelliptic curve DSA
algorithm would degrade even more. Given the diculty of nding hyperelliptic
curves for use in cryptography and the poor performance of the hyperelliptic curve
algorithms when compared to elliptic curves, there seems to be no benet in using
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hyperelliptic curves.
Yasuyuki Sakai, Kouichi Sakurai and Hirokazu Ishizuka investigated the dis-
crete logarithm problem over Jacobian varieties of hyperelliptic curves and claried
practical advantages of hyperelliptic cryptosystems compared to the elliptic cryptosys-
tems and to RSA [SSI98]. They focused on curves dened over a eld of characteristic
2 having genera g = 3 and 11. Furthermore, they discussed the eciency in the im-
plementation of such cryptosystems. They never did any actual implementation, but
they show the theoretical results in some tables in the end of the paper.
In [SS98], the authors of this paper focused on the DL problem over hyperel-
liptic curves, in the cases where the underlying eld has small characteristic 2, 3, 5,
and 7. They further implemented hyperelliptic cryptosystems over nite elds F 2n in
software on Alpha (467MHz) and Pentium-II (300MHz) computers.
If we look at the timings in Table 3.4, calculating the exponentiation with their
algorithm takes between 83.3 ms and 159 ms on the Alpha and between 476 ms and
2:36  104 ms on the Pentium for curves of the same security level as RSA-1024. They
also timed implementations on the Alpha for the Jacobians with the same security
level as RSA-2048, see Table 3.5. The results are 1:74  103 ms to 3:79  104 ms for
scalar multiplication depending on the nite eld. The hyperelliptic curves scalar
multiplication of smaller elds are a few times slower than the elliptic curves cases.
In the appendix of the paper they list hyperelliptic curves suited for cryptographic
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g J(v2 + v = f(u); F 2n) Addition Doubling Scalar
(msec) (msec) (msec)
F 2n f(u) Alpha P-II Alpha P-II Alpha P-II
3 F 259 u7 0.54 67.6 0.26 34.1 83.3 1:17  104
4 F 241 u9 + u7 + u3 + 1 0.55 67.2 0.26 33.3 96.6 1:09  104
5 F 241 u11 + u5 + u+ 1 0.88 109 0.48 58.7 183 2:36  104
6 F 229 u13 + u11 + u7
+ u3 + 1 0.83 2.68 0.44 1.45 159 476
Table 3.4: Timings of Jacobians which have the same level of security as RSA-1024
[SS98]
g J C size of Addition Doubling Scalar
Pmax (msec) (msec) (msec)
3 J(C; F 289) v2 + v = u7 246-bit 85.3 42.8 2:57  104
3 J(C; F 2113) v2 + v = u7 310-bit 118 58.9 3:79  104
11 J(C; F 247) v2 + v = u23 310-bit 5.04 3.13 1:74  103
Table 3.5: Timings of Jacobians which have the same level of security as RSA-2048
[SS98]
applications.
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Yasuyuki Sakai and Kouichi Sakurai published a third and more recent paper
[SS00]. This paper also deals with the practical performance of hyperelliptic curve
cryptosystems in software implementations. They analyzed the complexity of the
group law on Jacobians JC(F p) and JC(F 2n) and compare their performance, taking
into consideration the eectiveness of the word size of the CPU. In this work it was
shown that JC(F 2n) is faster than JC(F p) on a DEC Alpha processor, whereas JC(F p)
is faster then JC(F 2n) on a Pentium processor. Moreover, they investigated the eld
and polynomial arithmetic, as well as the group operation, to clarify the results from a
practical point of view, with the theoretical analysis done by them and Enge [Eng99].
The timing results from their implementation can be found in Table 3.6 and 3.7. The
paper gives a nice overview in terms of theory and practical implementation of the
state-of-the-art in hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems.
g J(v2 + v = f(u); F 2n) Addition Doubling Scalar
(msec) (msec) (msec)
F 2n f(u) Alpha P-II Alpha P-II Alpha P-II
3 F p, (log2p = 60) u7 0.39 - 0.38 - 98 -
6 F p, (log2p = 29) u13 0.28 0.83 0.26 0.80 66 189
Table 3.6: Timings of JC(F p). On DEC Alpha 21164A (6000 MHz) and Pentium II
(300 MHz) [SS00]
Uwe Krieger implemented in his thesis in 1997 a C library to sign messages
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g J(v2 + v = f(u); F 2n) Addition Doubling Scalar
(msec) (msec) (msec)
F 2n f(u) Alpha P-II Alpha P-II Alpha P-II
3 F 259 u7 0.30 - 0.09 - 40 -
4 F 241 u9 + u7 + u3 + 1 0.30 - 0.10 - 43 -
5 F 241 u11 + u5 + u+ 1 0.34 1.40 0.10 0.48 46 182
6 F 229 u13 + u11 + u7
+ u3 + 1 0.47 1.76 0.13 0.56 61 227
Table 3.7: Timings of JC(F 2n). On DEC Alpha 21164A (600 MHz) and Pentium II
(300 MHz) [SS00]
based on a hyperelliptic cryptosystems [Kri97]. In the second chapter he explains the
mathematical background that is needed, including an introduction to hyperelliptic
curves. The third part describes the actual implementation that he did. He imple-
mented three dierent versions of an Elliptic curve cryptosystem and two dierent
versions of Hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems. He shows a table in his result section,
where he applies the algorithm of Cantor and compares dierent genera, see Table
3.8. As a conclusion, Krieger gives a table that compares the time needed for a sig-
nature with RSA, Elliptic curves and HECC, which we reproduce as Table 3.9. He
further notes, that Elliptic curve cryptosystems as well as HECC can compete with
RSA in terms of speed.
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At the time of this writing, we are not aware of any published work that report
on hardware implementations of a hyperelliptic curve based on cryptosystem.
g eld scalar (sec)
1 128 3:5  10−1
2 64 5:2  10−1
3 42 1.2
4 31 1.1
5 25 1.8
6 21 2.6
7 18 3.9
8 16 5.1
Table 3.8: Scalar multiplication [Kri97]
3.2 Elliptic Curve Implementations
This subsection describes one hardware and one software elliptic curve implementa-
tion report which were both crucial for the design presented in this thesis. Note that
the eld of elliptic curve cryptosystems is large, and we restrict ourselves to the most
relevant work.
In [OP00], Gerardo Orlando and Christof Paar deal with a high performance
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crypto system timing
RSA with 1024 bit 0.53 sec
Elliptic curve 0.11 sec
HECC with genus=2 0.84 sec
Table 3.9: Comparison of three cryptosystems [Kri97]
recongurable elliptic curve processor for GF (2m). The processor is scalable in terms
of area and speed. It exploits the abilities of recongurable hardware to deliver
optimized circuitry for dierent elliptic curves and nite elds. The main features
of this architecture are the use of an optimized bit-parallel squarer, a digit-serial
multiplier, and two programmable processors. For this thesis we used the squarer and
the multiplier architecture described in the paper to perform the eld operations. The
bit-parallel squarer is capable of computing a square in one clock cycle. The squaring
of a eld element A(x) =
Pm−1
i=0 aix
i 2 GF (2m); ai 2 GF (2) is ruled by the following
equation:
A2(x) 
m−1X
i=0
aix
2i mod F (x)
The multiplication of two eld elements A(x) and B(x) can be expressed as
seen in Equation 3.1. The equation is arranged so that it facilitates the understanding
of the digit-serial multiplier used. In the equation B(x) is expressed in kD digits
(1  kD  dm=De) as follows: B(x) =
PkD−1
i=0 Bi(x)x
Di, where Bi(x) =
PD−1
j=0 bDi+jx
j
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and D is the digit size in bits.
A(x)B(x)  (A(x)
kD−1X
i=0
Bi(x)x
Di) mod F (x) (3.1)
 (
kD−1X
i=0
Bi(x)(Ax
Di mod F (x))) mod F (x) (3.2)
This multiplier computes a product sum A(x)B(x) + C(x) mod F (x) within dm=De
clock cycles, as shown in Algorithm 3.2.1. More precisely, the product is computed
in kD clock cycles. The performance and complexity of this multiplier is a function
of the digit size D [SP97].
Algorithm 3.2.1 [OP00]
Input: A(x)
Pm−1
i=0 aix
i, B(x) =
PkD−1
i=0 Bi(x)x
Di, Bi(x) =
PD−1
j=0 bDi+jx
j
Output: C(x) = (A(x)B(x) + C(x)) mod F (x)
1. C(x) = 0 or the previous value of C(x)
2. For i = 0 to kD − 1 do:
2.1 C(x) = Bi(x)(Ax
Di mod F (x)) + C(x)
3. C(x) = C(x) mod F (x)
Darrel Hankerson, Julio Lopez Hernandez, and Alfred Menezes presented an exten-
sive and careful study of the software implementation on workstations of the NIST-
recommended elliptic curves over binary elds [HHM00]. They also presented results
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of an implementation in C on a Pentium II 400 MHz workstation. Algorithm 3.2.2
was introduced in Section 3.4 of this thesis. This algorithm computes the inverse of a
non-zero eld element a 2 F 2m using a variant of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
for polynomials. The algorithm maintains the invariants ba+ df = u and ca+ ef = v
for some d and e which are not explicitly computed. The algorithm performs at
each iteration, if deg(u)  deg(v), the partial division of u by v, by subtraction xjv
from u, where j = deg(u) − deg(v). In this way the degree of u is decreased by at
least 1, and on average by 2. Subtraction xjc from b preserves the invariants. The
algorithm terminates when deg(u) = 0, in which case u = 1 and ba + df = 1; hence
b = a−1 mod f(x).
Algorithm 3.2.2 [HHM00]
Input: a 2 F 2m , a 6= 0
Output: a−1 mod f(x)
1. Set b 1, u a, v  f
2. While deg(r1) 6= 0 Do:
3.1 j  deg(u)− deg(v)
3.2 If j < 0 Then: u$ v, b$ c, j  −j
3.3 u u+ xj  v, b b+ xj  c
3. return(b)
Chapter 4
Implementation of Field- and
Polynomial-Arithmethic
4.1 Field Arithmetic Implementation
The elements of the Jacobians are represented as polynomials where the coecients
are elements of a nite eld, as described in Section 2.5. In order to perform poly-
nomial operations, it is necessary to be able to realize eld operations. We only
concentrate on elds of characteristic two. In this section we will describe imple-
mentation techniques for the eld operations and in Section 4.2 we will focus on the
polynomial operations. To perform an addition in the Jacobian we need the eld oper-
ations: addition, multiplication/squaring and inversion. In the following, we assume
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a polynomial representation of the nite eld elements. The irreducible polynomial
will be denoted as F (x). For a thorough treatment of nite elds the reader is referred
to, e.g., [LN86].
4.1.1 Field Addition
The addition of two eld elements in F 2m is accomplished by a bitwise XORing of the
eld elements. Subtraction of two eld elements is done in the same way since each
element is its own additive inverse. Algorithm 4.1.1 describes the pseudo code:
Algorithm 4.1.1
Input: A(x) =
Pm−1
i=0 aix
i, B(x) =
Pm−1
i=0 bix
i, where A;B 2 GF (2m); ai; bi 2 GF (2)
Output: C(x) =
Pm−1
i=0 cix
i, where C 2 GF (2m); ci 2 GF (2)
1. For j = 0 to m− 1
1.1 ci = ai + bi mod 2
This means that we can write C(x) = A(x) + B(x) =
Pm−1
i=0 ((ai + bi) mod
2)xi =
Pm−1
i=0 cix
i. In terms of hardware, we need m parallel XOR units (denoted by
). Each unit computes (ai  bi), as shown in Figure 4.1.
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a0
b0
c0
a1
b1
c1
am-1
bm-1
cm-1
.
.
.
.
Figure 4.1: Addition in GF (2m)
4.1.2 Field Multiplication
The product of two eld elements is calculated with the LSD multiplier introduced
in [SP97] and the implementation of [OP00]. For more details on LSD multipliers
see [BP99, SV93]. The multiplication of two eld elements A(x) and B(x) can be
expressed as followed, where D is the digit-size:
A(x)B(x)  (A(x)
kD−1X
i=0
Bi(x)x
Di) mod F (x)
 (
kD−1X
i=0
Bi(x)(Ax
Di mod F (x))) mod F (x)
The product can be calculated in dm=De clock cycles [OP00], as D bits are processed
in one clock cycle.
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4.1.3 Field Squaring
The squaring of a eld element A(x) =
Pm−1
i=0 aix
i is ruled by the following equation:
A2(x) 
m−1X
i=0
aix
2i mod F (x), where ai 2 F 2
Let’s look at a small example to see how it works:
Example: Let F (x) = x5 + x2 + 1 and
A(x) = a4x4 + a3x3 + a2x2 + a1x+ a0 2 GF (2m). Thus,
A2(x) = [a4x
4 + a3x
3 + a2x
2 + a1x+ a0]
2 = a4x
8 + a3x
6 + a2x
4 + a1x
2 + a0
If we now reduce the x-terms equal to or higher than x5 modulo the
eld polynomial, we get: a3x6  a3(x3 + x) mod F (x), a4x8  a4(x3 +
x2 + 1) mod F (x). Hence, with replacing the modulo-two-additions by
XORs (): A2(x)  a4(x3 + x2 + 1) + a3(x3 + x) + a2x4 + a1x2 + a0 
a2x4 + (a4  a3)x3 + (a4  a1)x2 + a3x+ (a4  a0) mod F (x). We obtain
a output polynomial O(x) = A2(x) =
Pm−1
i=0 oix
i:
o0  a0 XOR a4
o1  a3
o2  a1 XOR a4
o3  a3 XOR a4
o4  a2
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The bit-parallel squarer is capable of computing a square in one clock cycle
and requires at most (r−1)(m−1) gates [PFSR99, Wu99, OP00], where r represents
the number of non-zero coecients of the eld polynomial. Hence the complexity is
at most (m+ t+1)=2 gates for irreducible trinomials F (x) = xm+xt+1 and 4(m−1)
gates for pentanomials F (x) = xm + xt1 + xt2 + xt3 + 1 [Wu99].
4.1.4 Field Inversion
One way to calculate the inverse based on a modication of Fermat’s Little Theorem.
For any prime number p, the theorem reads for characteristic two elds as follows:
ap−1  1(modp), for all a 2 F p
Hence, a  a2m−2  1 mod F (x), where F (x) is the eld polynomial, a 2 F 2m . There-
fore, a−1  a2m−2 mod F (x). Using the standard square-and multiply we need m− 2
multiplications and m squarings [MvOV96]. That means that we need at most
(m − 2)  dm=De clock cycles for the multiplications and m clock cycles to realize
the squarings, if the architectures described earlier are being used. In total we need
[(m− 2)  dm=De] +m clock cycles.
A more ecient way to calculate the inverse is to use the Extended Euclidean
Algorithm (EEA). Dierent ways to implement the EEA for integers as well as for
polynomials can be found for example in the following books [vzGG99, MvOV96,
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Ber68, Aho74, Knu98] and in numerous papers [Moe73, BCH93, Jeb93, HHM00]. In
[HHM00] the authors present a version of the EEA (Algorithm 3.2.2) to calculate an
inverse in F 2m. This algorithm is well suited for an implementation on FPGAs. The
algorithm does not use any divisions, but multiplications of eld elements by xj and
additions. The multiplication by xj is a j-position left shift, which is a very ecient
operation and carries virtually no delay in hardware. The addition of two polynomials
is just the bitwise XORing of the coecients, as described in Section 4.1.1.
Per iteration, we need one clock cycle for the calculation of j, for the swapping
of the eld elements, for the shifting, for the addition, and for the calculation of the
degree. This means we need 5 clock cycles for one iteration. We have to iterate at
most m times. Consequently, in the worst case, 5  2m clock cycles are needed for the
calculation of the inverse with the version of the EEA as stated above.
In [IT88], the authors proposed a way to compute the multiplicative inverses
in GF (2m) using normal bases. They perform an inversion with at most 2[log2(m−1)]
multiplications in GF (2m) and (m− 1) cyclic shifts.
4.2 Implementation of the Polynomial Operations
If we look at Algorithms 2.6.1, 6.2.1, 2.6.3, and 2.6.4, and the description in Chapter
6, we can see that we have to provide the following functions in order to implement
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the addition on hyperelliptic curves:
 polynomial addition (poly sum)
 polynomial multiplication (poly prod)
 polynomial squaring (poly squa)
 polynomial gcd (poly gcd)
 polynomial division (poly quot)
 polynomial inversion (poly inverse)
The polynomials that we encounter are of the form: A(u) = akuk+ak−1uk−1 +
:::+ a2u
2 + a1u+ a0, where ai 2 F 2m. Let us now analyze the architectures for each
of the functions.
4.2.1 Polynomial Addition
The poly sum is a function that implements the addition of two polynomials. Since
the coecients of the polynomials are elements in GF (2m), this is done by bitwise
XORing. The pseudo code looks like the one for the addition of two eld elements
(see Algorithm 4.1.1). The only dierence is that we now work not only with one
eld element. We have to add at most (deg[P (u)]+1) eld elements, where deg[P (u)]
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is the degree and m is the extension degree of the eld over which the polynomial
is dened. In hardware terms that means we need [(deg[P (u)] + 1)  m] gates to
implement a polynomial adder. We can do the whole addition in one clock cycle.
It is also an advantage to have a function that adds three polynomials at the
same time (poly 3sum). This gives us the possibility to add three polynomials in
one clock cycle, whereas otherwise we would need two cycles. This is achieved by
XORing three elements, instead of two, of the input vectors, which requires twice as
many XOR gates.
4.2.2 Polynomial Multiplication
In order to provide a polynomial multiplication we could use the schoolbook method.
This means we would multiply each coecient from the rst polynomial with each
coecient of the second polynomial. We could use Algorithm 3.2.1 for the calcu-
lation of a eld multiplication. This can be a good approach for certain software
implementations, but not very ecient for hardware implementation as it only com-
putes one coecient product at a time. The method we used for the polynomial
multiplication is shown in Figure 4.2. It parallelizes k coecient multiplications.
We multiply two polynomials A(u) = akuk + ak−1uk−1 + ::: + a2u2 + a1u + a0 and
B(u) = bnu
n + bn−1un−1 + :::+ b2u2 + b1u+ b0, where ai; bi 2 GF (2m). We start doing
a scalar multiplication of the highest coecient from A times the whole polynomial
Field- and Polynomial- Arithmethic 46
B(u): ak  B(u). Afterwards we take the next coecient of A: ak−1  B(u) and do
the scalar multiplication and so on. The result of each scalar multiplication is added
to the total result. The total result is shifted by one coecient after each addition.
Hence we calculate step by step the output polynomial of the polynomial multiplica-
tion: R(u) = rk+muk+m + rk+m−1uk+m−1 + :::+ r2u2 + r1u+ r0 . This is summarized
in the following pseudo code:
Algorithm 4.2.1
Input: A(u) =
Pk−1
i=0 aiu
i, B(u) =
Pn−1
i=0 biu
i,
where ai; bi 2 GF (2m) and k = deg(A(u))  deg(B(u)) = n
Output: R(u) =
Pkn−1
i=0 riu
i, where ri 2 GF (2m)
1. R(u) = 0
2. For j = deg(A(u)) down to 0
2.1 tmp(u)! (aj) B(u)
2.2 R(u)! R(u) + tmp(u)
2.3 R(u) << 1 (shift R(u) by one coecient)
3. Return (R(u))
One scalar multiplication (step 2.1 in the algorithm) takes the same amount
of clock cycles as a eld multiplication, that means we need dm=De clock cycles with
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the eld multiplier introduced in Subsection 4.1.2. In the worst case we multiply a
polynomial of degree 2g + 1 by a polynomial of degree g. Therefore we would need
at most [g  dm=De] clock cycles.
= multiplication of two elements in GF(2m)
= addition of two elements in GF(2m)
= shift by on coefficient of the polynomial
r2 r(k+m-1)
...
bn, bn-1, ... , b1, b0
ak ak-1
r1
a0...
...
... r(k+m)
Figure 4.2: Block diagram of the polynomial multiplication
4.2.3 Polynomial Squaring
The squaring of a polynomial is a relatively easy operation. The pseudo code is shown
in Algorithm 4.2.2:
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Algorithm 4.2.2
Input: A(u) =
Pk−1
i=0 aiu
i, where ai 2 GF (2m)
Output: C(u) =
P(2k)−1
i=0 ciu
i, where ci 2 GF (2m)
1. For j = 0 to deg(A(u)) + 1
1.1 c2j  (aj)2 mod P (u)
2. Return (C(u))
From a hardware point of view, we just need deg(A(u)) + 1 eld squarers to perform
polynomial squaring. This calculation takes one clock cycle, if we assume that the
eld squarer computes a result in one clock cycle.
4.2.4 Polynomial gcd
The greatest common divisor (gcd) of two polynomials can be calculated with the
Extended Euclidean Algorithm. The theory of greatest common divisors and the
Euclidean Algorithm for integers carries over in a straightforward manner to the
polynomial ring F q [x]. Where F q is a nite eld of order q.
Denition 4.2.3 [MvOV96] Let g(x), h(x) 2 F p[x], where not both are 0. The
greatest common divisor of g(x) and h(x), denoted as gcd(g(x); h(x)), is the monic
polynomial of greatest degree in Z q[x] which divides both g(x) and h(x).
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Remark: the gcd of two polynomials has to be a monic polynomial. This is
done by dividing all coecients with the leading coecient. In our implementation
we worked only in elds of characteristic 2 and therefore did not have to normalize.
Algorithm 4.2.4 provides the EEA for polynomials [MvOV96]:
Algorithm 4.2.4
Input: Two polynomials r0(x), r1(x) 2 F q[x]
Output: d(x) = gcd(r0(x); r1(x)) and polynomials s(x), t(x) 2 F q [x] which satisfy
s(x)r0(x) + t(x)r1(x) = d(x)
1. If r1(x) = 0 then set d(x) r0(x), s(x) 1, t(x) 0 and return (d(x), s(x),
t(x))
2. Set s0(x) 1, s1(x) 0, t0(x) 0, t1(x) 1
3. While r1(x) 6= 0 do:
3.1 q(x) r0(x) div r1(x), r2(x) r0(x)− r1(x)q(x)
3.2 s2(x) s0(x)− q(x)s1(x), t2(x) t0(x)− q(x)t1(x)
3.3 r0(x) r1(x), r1(x) r2(x)
3.4 s0(x) s1(x), s1(x) s2(x), t0(x) t1(x), and t1(x) t2(x)
4. Set d(x) r0(x), s(x) s0(x), t(x) t0(x)
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5. Return (d(x), s(x), t(x))
In [HHM00] the authors present an EEA algorithm to calculate the inverse
in F 2m . This algorithm is well suited for implementation on FPGAs, because the
algorithm does not use any divisions. This algorithm can be modied to compute the
gcd and the two polynomials s(x) and t(x), instead of just the inverse. The modied
version is shown in Algorithm 4.2.5:
Algorithm 4.2.5
Input: r0(x), r1(x) 2 F 2m, where deg(r0) > deg(r1)
Output: d(x) = gcd(r0(x); r1(x)) and s(x), t(x) 2 F 2m which satisfy s(x)r0(x) +
t(x)r1(x) = d(x)
1. Set s0(x) 1, s1(x) 0, t0(x) 0, t1(x) 1
2. While deg(r1) 6= 0 do:
2.1 j  deg(r1)− deg(r0)
2.2 if j < 0 then: r0 $ r1, t0 $ t1, s0 $ s1, j  −j
2.3 r1  r1 + xj  r0
2.4 t1  t1 + xj  t0, s1  s1 + xj  s0
3. Set d(x) r1(x), s(x) s1(x), t(x) t1(x)
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4. Return (d(x), s(x), t(x))
We now have to modify this algorithm, so that we are able to calculate the
gcd of two polynomials that have coecients in F 2m . Algorithm 4.2.5 works only for
polynomials that have coecients in F 2. That means we have to replace each of the
three shifts in Step 2.3 and 2.4 of Algorithm 4.2.5 with a shift, a eld inversion and a
eld multiplication. These two steps (step 2.3 and 2.4) look like the following, where
LC() denotes the leading coecient of the polynomial:
2.3 r1  r1 + xj  [LC(r0)=LC(r1)]  r0
2.4 t1  t1 + xj  [LC(r0)=LC(r1)]  t0, s1  s1 + xj  [LC(r0)=LC(r1)]  s0
The eld inversion is of course very expensive in terms of resources and time.
We modied the algorithm as suggested by [Mon01] to avoid the inverse computation
in each iteration, see 4.2.6:
Algorithm 4.2.6
Input: Two polynomials r0(u) = akuk + ak−1uk−1 + ::: + a2u2 + a1u + a0, r1(u) =
bnun + bn−1un−1 + :::+ b2u2 + b1u+ b0, where ai; bi 2 F 2m and deg(r0) > deg(r1)
Output: d(u) = gcd(r0(u); r1(u)) and polynomials s(u), t(u) which satisfy s(u)r0(u)+
t(u)r1(u) = d(u)
1. Set s0(u) 1, s1(u) 0, t0(u) 0, t1(u) 1
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2. While r1 6= 0 do:
2.1 j  deg(r1)− deg(r0)
2.2 if j < 0 then: r0 $ r1, t0 $ t1, s0 $ s1, j  −j
2.3 r1  LC(r0)  r1 + uj  LC(r1)  r0
2.4 t1  LC(r0)  t1 + uj  LC(r1)  t0, s1  LC(r0)  s1 + uj  LC(r1)  s0
3. Set d(u) LC(r0)−1  r1(u), s(u) LC(r0)−1  s1(x), t(x) LC(r0)−1  t1(x)
4. Return (d(u), s(u), t(u))
Remark 1: The multiplications that we have to provide in Step 2.3 and Step
2.4 are scalar multiplications. We multiply one coecient with a polynomial; this
means we do not have to do a full polynomial multiplication.
Remark 2: In order to be able to compute Step 3, we have to calculate a eld
inversion of the leading coecient of the polynomial r0. The inverse is then multiplied
(a scalar multiplication) with r1(x), s1(x) and t1(x) and the results is stored in d(c),
s(x), and t(x), respectively.
In every iteration of the while-loop we calculate j, switch all values if j < 0,
shift three polynomials by j, do six scalar multiplications and add the calculated
values in order to obtain the new values for r1, t1 and s1. That means we need
1 + 1 + 1 + dm=De + 1 clock cycles for every iteration, if we assume that all six scalar
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multiplications are computed in parallel. The while-loop is executed at most deg(r0)+
1 times, i.e. g + 1 times, since the degree of the polynomial r0 is reduced by at
least by one in each iteration. We need another [5  m + 2] cycles for the inversion
and dm=De cycles for the scalar multiplication in step 3. So the total is at most
[(g + 1)  (4 + dm=De)] + [5 m+ 2] + dm=De clock cycles.
4.2.5 Polynomial Division
Possible algorithms to calculate the quotient of two polynomials can be found in
[vzGG99, Ber68, Knu98, Aho74]. In [vzGG99] a method to calculate the quotient of
two polynomials was introduced, but these algorithms do not calculate the remainder.
What they do is they truncate the polynomials. They are based on the observation
that the quotient of two polynomials of degrees deg1 and deg2, with deg1 > deg2,
depends only on the 2(deg1− deg2) + 1 highest coecients of the dividend and the
deg1− deg2 +1 highest coecients of the divisor.
Example: Let p1(x) = x5 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1 and p2(x) = x4− 2x3 +
3x2 + x− 7. Let p1(x) = q(x)  p2 + r(x) with deg(r) < deg(p2).
Hence, q(x) = x+ 3 and r(x) = 4x3 − 9x2 + 5x− 22.
If we truncate the polynomial p1(x) by 2(deg1− deg2) + 1 = 3, we get
p1(x) = x
3 + x2 + x + 1. The polynomial p2(x) will be truncated by
deg1− deg2 +1 = 2 and we get p2(x) = x2 − 2x + 3. If we now calculate
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the quotient q(x) and r(x) we will get the following results: q(x) = x+3
and r(x) = 4x− 8.
It can be seen that with the truncated polynomials we get the correct result for
the quotient, but not for the remainder. In order to obtain the truncated polynomial
from the original polynomial, we just have to shift the coecients to the right by
(2 deg2− deg1) positions. If we store the polynomials in registers, we need a (deg1 +1)-
bit register and a (deg2 +1)-bit register. We know that deg1 > deg2. Therefore we
have to truncate p1 by 2(deg1− deg2)+1, that is equal to a right shift by (deg1 +1)−
[2(deg1− deg2) + 1] = 2 deg2− deg1. We have to shift the polynomial p2 with the
lower degree deg2: (deg2 +1)− [deg1− deg2 +1] = 2 deg2− deg1.
The method of providing a truncation before we divide means that we would
not have to deal with vectors that are as long as the original vectors. The drawback
would be that we have to add some more gates to truncate the polynomials. If we
compare the method of truncating the polynomials with a straightforward polynomial
division, we will nd out that the number of iterations that is need for both methods
is the same. This results from the fact that the dierence of the degrees of the two
polynomials will stay the same in both methods. We decided to go for the division
without truncation. Therefore we have to use a bigger register for the vector so
that we do not have to truncate the polynomials. This assures us to get the correct
remainder, and hence we can use the polynomial division for modulo reduction if
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necessary.
Algorithms 4.2.7 computes q(u) and r(u) such that A(u) = q(u) B(u) + r(u)
with deg(r) < deg(B) for given A(u) and B(u).
Algorithm 4.2.7
Input: Dividend A(u) = akuk + ak−1uk−1 + :::+ a2u2 + a1u+ a0 and divisor B(u) =
bnun + bn−1un−1 + :::+ b2u2 + b1u+ b0, where ai; bi 2 F 2m and deg(A) > deg(B)
Output: Quotient q(u) and remainder r(u), where A(u) = q(u) B(u) + r(u)
1. inverse LC[B(u)]−1
2. For j for (deg[A(u)]− deg[B(u)]) down to 0 do:
2.1 factor  LC[(A(u)]  invers
2.2 factor  factor uj
2.3 temp B(u) B(u)  factor
2.4 A(u) A(u) + temp B(u), q(u) q(u)+factor
3. Set r(u) A(u)
4. Return (q(u), r(u))
Remark: The multiplication by uj can be realized by a left shift. We also
notice that we have to do only one eld inversion (Step 1.) and no full polynomial
multiplication.
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The resulting design is presented in Figure 4.3.
field_
mult
field_
shift
scalar_
mult
poly_
add
A(u)
A(u), B(u)
Q(u), R(u)
field_
inversion
LC[B(u)]
LC[B(u)]-1 LC[A(u)]
uj
j=deg(A) - deg(B)
B(u)
Figure 4.3: Block diagram of the polynomial division
We need [5 m]+2 cycle counts for the eld inversion. The eld multiplication
will take dm=De cycles, the shift will take one cycle, the scalar multiplication takes
also dm=De cycles, the addition is done in one cycle count. In total we will have at
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most 2 + (5 m) + (deg[A(u)]− deg[B(u)])  (2  dm=De + 2) cycle counts.
4.2.6 Polynomial Inversion
The inverse can be calculated via Algorithm 4.2.6 in Section 4.2.4. This means that we
just use our gcd implementation for the inverse calculation, with s(x) as the inverse.
Chapter 5
Design Methodology
This chapter describes the process to actually design the architecture of FPGAs.
Parts of this section were presented in [Ros98] and [ECYP00].
There are two basic hardware design methodologies currently available: lan-
guage based (high level) design and schematic based (low level) design. Language
based design relies upon synthesis tools to implement the desired hardware. While
synthesis tools continue to improve, they rarely achieve the most optimized imple-
mentation in terms of both area and speed when compared to a schematic imple-
mentation. As a result, synthesized designs tend to be (slightly) larger and slower
than their schematic based counterparts. Additionally, implementation results can
vary greatly depending on the synthesis tool as well as the design being synthesized,
leading to potentially increased variances in the synthesized results when comparing
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synthesis tool outputs. This situation is not entirely dierent from a software imple-
mentation of an algorithm in a high-level language such as C, which is also dependent
on coding style and compiler quality. Schematic based design methodologies are no
longer feasible for supporting the increase in architectural complexity provided by
modern FPGAs. As a result, a language based design methodology was chosen as the
implementation form for the hyperelliptic curve cryptosystem with VHDL being the
specic language chosen.
5.1 The Design Cycle
The general design cycle for High Description Language (HDL) architectures consisted
of the following steps:
1. Research of arithmetic functions.
2. Research of hyperelliptic curve constructs.
3. VHDL implementation of arithmetic functions.
5. Design of point addition/doubling hyperelliptic curve engine.
6. Logic verication of the design.
7. Synthesis and logic optimization.
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8. Device specic realization (place and route).
9. Back-annotated verication of the design.
We chose VHDL as the language to describe the design of the arithmetic needed
for the group operations on the hyperelliptic curve. We completely implemented both
group operations, i.e. the addition and doubling, in VHDL. We represented the divi-
sors with polynomials, as shown in Chapter 2. The coecients of these polynomials
are elements in F 2m . The VHDL design was simulated and the correctness of the
operation was veried.
For the entire design, i.e., the HEC group operation, steps 1{6, as described
above, were conducted. Verication of the design was rst performed on the logic
level basis. This step assured the correct functionality if all combinatorial and net
delays are ignored. In order to do the verication, we used the test vectors that were
produced from a C and NTL [Sho01] implementation (consult the next section for
more details about the calculation of test vectors). Once the design was logically
veried, we synthesized the modules performing the eld arithmetic (step 7). The
synthesis resulted in timing and area estimates. In order to achieve exact results,
however, steps 8 and 9 of the design cycle would still have to be conducted.
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5.2 Generating Random Divisors
From a cryptosystems point of view, we need a method of generating a random divisor
D 2 J(F qn). We used the method described in [Kob89b]. In order to use this method
we rst have to dene the trace:
Denition 5.2.1 [LN86] For  2 F = F qn and K = F q, the trace TrF=K() of 
over K is dened by
TrF=K() = + 
q + :::+ q
n−1
If K is the prime subeld of F , then TrF=K() is called the absolute trace of  and
simply denoted by TrF().
Let us now see how we may construct random divisors. We may regard C as
dened over F qn . Let C be v2 + h(u)v = f(u). Choose the coordinate u = x 2 F qn
at random. This means in our case x 2 F 2n . Attempt to solve v2 + h(u)v = f(u) for
v 2 F 2n . In the case that q is even, h(x) 6= 0 and the change of variables z = v=h(x)
leads to the equation z2 + z = a, where a = f(x)=h(x)2. This equation has a solution
z 2 F q if Tr
Fqn=F2a = 0 and does not have a solution if this trace is 1. In the latter
case, we must choose another u = x 2 F q and start again. In the former case, we can
nd z as follows: If q = 2n is an odd power of 2, simply set z =
P(n−1)=2
j=0 a
22j .
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5.3 Design Tools
Synplify by Synplicity, Inc. was used to synthesize the VHDL implementations of
the cryptosystem. As this study places a strong focus on high throughput imple-
mentations, the synthesis tools were set to optimize for speed. That means resultant
implementations exhibit the best possible throughput with the associated cost being
an increase in the area required in the FPGA for each of the implementations. Simi-
larly, if the synthesis tools were set to optimize for area, the resultant implementations
would exhibit reduced area requirements at the cost of decreased throughput. How-
ever, this theory does not always hold true for certain algorithms and architectures.
This contradiction is caused by the underlying proprietary synthesis tool algorithms
| dierent synthesis algorithms tend to yield dierent implementations for the same
VHDL code.
XACTstep 2.1i by Xilinx, Inc. was used to place and route the synthesized
implementations.
Finally, Speedwave by Viewlogic Systems, Inc. and Active-HDLTM by ALDEC,
Inc. were used to perform behavioral and timing simulations for the implementations
of the cryptosystem. The simulations veried both the functionality and the ability
to operate at the designated clock frequencies for the implementations.
Chapter 6
Towards an Architecture for a the
Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptosystem
For the implementation of a Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptosystem (HECC) we need to
implement the additive group operation, i.e., addition and doubling of elements of
the Jacobian represented by divisors. All the algorithms needed, can be found in
Section 2.6. Architectures for the eld operations and polynomial operations can be
found in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
Our goal was an architecture which is optimized for the use of hyperelliptic
curves with h(u) = 1. Hence the equation of the curve is v2 + v = f(u). We also
restricted ourselves to elds of characteristic 2 and to irreducible eld polynomials of
the form P (x) = xm + xt + 1. Divisors D = (a(u); b(u)) are implemented as a pair
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of polynomials, a(u); b(u) 2 F 2m [u]. Each polynomial is represented as a vector with
(3  g + 2) m bits, where g is the genus of the HECC and we work in the underlying
eld F 2m . From Algorithm 2.6.1 it is easy to see that the largest number of bits
needed to represent polynomials will be (3  g + 2) m bits.
6.1 Implementation of the Addition Operation
As seen in Section 2.6, the addition of two divisors on a hyperelliptic curve, involves
two steps: composition (\hyper composition") and reduction (\hyper reduction"), see
Figure 6.1.
hyper_
addition
Polynomials Divisor 1:
(A1,B1)
Polynomials Divisor 2:
(A2,B2)
Curve C & field GF()
Polynomials Divisor 3:
(A,B)
hyper_
reduction
Polynomials
Divisor 3:
(A,B)
hyper_
composition
Curve C & field GF()
Polynomials
Divisor 3':
(A',B')
Polynomials divisor 1:
(A1,B1)
Polynomials divisor 2:
(A2,B2)
Figure 6.1: Block diagram for addition on Hyperelliptic Curves
We will consider two steps of the addition, separately, in order to nd out how
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to connect and how to parallelize the entities that we have to implement. The next
section will describe the composition step.
6.1.1 Implementation of the Composition Step
We can divide the composition step into three parts, represented by three modules.
The rst step is the calculation of the gcd of three polynomials (poly 3gcd). The next
steps are the calculation of the output polynomial A0(u) and the output polynomial
B0(u), as can be seen in Figure 6.2 (where calA and calB are the names of the modules
that provide this functionality, respectively).
Let us now have a closer look at the implementation of the steps needed for the
composition, starting with the poly 3gcd. With poly 3gcd we indicate the calculation
of the gcd of three polynomials; whereas the term poly gcd denotes the module for
the calculation of the gcd of only two polynomials.
We are faced with two possible implementation options to nd the gcd of the
three polynomials a1, a2, and (b1 + b2 + h) with:
gcd(a1; a2; (b1 + b2 + h)) = d = s1a1 + s2a2 + s3(b1 + b2 + h)
One possibility would be to calculate the gcd as shown in Algorithm 2.6.1. First
calculate the gcd of a1 and a2: d1 = gcd (a1; a2) = e1a1 + e2a2. The calculated d1 is
used as an input for the second gcd calculation together with the sum (b1 + b2 + h):
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calB
s1
B'
s2
s3
d
A1
A2
B1
B2
A
f
A1
A2
B1
B2
h
f
calA A'
d
A1
A2
B'
A'
extended
_3gcd
A1
A2 s1
s2
d
B1
B2
h
s3
Figure 6.2: Block diagram of the composition step
d = gcd(d1; b1 + b2 + h) = c1d1 + c2(b1 + b2 + h). Let s1 = c1e1, s2 = c1e2, and
s3 = c2, such that d = s1a1 + s2a2 + s3(b1 + b2 + h). This is described in Figure
6.3. The second possibility would be to use a special algorithm that calculates the
gcd of three polynomials. An algorithm to implement the gcd calculation of several
polynomials can be found in [vzGG99]. For the option shown in Figure 6.3 we have to
provide poly prod, poly add, and twice the calculation of the gcd of two polynomials
(poly gcd) to be able to calculate the poly 3gcd.
We will now analyze the complexity of both options and decide which one
oers better performance. If we look at Figure 6.3 or at Algorithm 2.6.1, we see that
the result of the rst gcd calculation is an input for the second gcd calculation. This
means that the result after the computation of the two poly gcd and poly prod will
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poly_gcd
A1
A2
e1
e2
d1
poly_add
B1
B2
h
(B1+B2+h) poly_gcd
d1
c1
c2
d
poly_prod
e1
c1
s1
poly_prod
c1
e2
s2
s3
d
Figure 6.3: Block diagram of the calculation of poly 3gcd
be the same as if we would calculate a gcd of three input polynomials. To be able to
calculate the gcd of three polynomials, we just have to combine the rst, second, and
third step of Algorithm 2.6.1. Or, in terms of hardware, we have to build a module
that replaces two poly gcd and poly prod in Figure 6.3 by a function that calculates
the gcd of three polynomials.
In [Eng99] the author analyzed the average complexity of the arithmetic in
the hyperelliptic Jacobian over any nite eld. He also determined the exact average
number of eld operations for computing the greatest common divisor of polynomials
of the EEA. Lemma 6 in this publication shows that two randomly chosen polynomials
over F q are coprime with a probability of 1−1=q. We are working with large elds and
therefore the probability is almost one. Hence no further computations involving the
third polynomial are needed. That does not mean that we do not have to calculate
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the gcd of our given polynomials at all, since the coecients s1 and s2 are needed,
but it means that it is worth testing for coprimality after the calculation of the gcd
of two polynomials. If they are coprime, we do not have to calculate the second
polynomial gcd and s3. Hence, s1 = e1, s2 = e2 and s3 = 0 if the two polynomials a1
and a2 are coprime. Thus the implementation option shown in Figure 6.3, with two
gcd calculations is preferable.
Let us now consider the calculation of the two resulting polynomials after the
composition step A0(u) (see Figure 6.4) and B0(u) (see Figure 6.5). All necessary
modules are described in Chapter 4.2 and we just have to build the state machines
to calculate the results of the composition step.
poly_quot
d2
A1 * A2
A'
poly_prod
A1
A2
poly_squad d2
Figure 6.4: Block diagram of the calculation of A0(u)
If we implement calA and calB in two modules as suggested so far, we miss
the opportunity to run parts of the two calculations in parallel. Parallelization is not
possible, because the output A0(u) is an input to the module calculating B0(u). A
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A1
A2
B1
B2
f
s1
s2
s3
d
poly_
prod
poly_
prod
B1
poly_
prod poly_
sum
B1 *
B2
f
poly_
sum
poly_
prod
(B1B2
+ f)
s3
A
sum
A'
d
poly_
quot mod B'
Figure 6.5: Block diagram of the calculation of B0(u)
better approach would be to have a state machine that has as input the two divisors
D1(A1; B1), D2(A2; B2) and the output of poly 3gcd. In this way we could parallelize
the calculation of A0(u) and B0(u). Figure 6.6 shows the parallel approach. In this
gure all the modules that can start the calculation at the same time or do the
calculation in parallel are drawn underneath each another. This means the time axis
is from left to right.
Remark: The calculation of the poly 3gcd is not shown in Figure 6.6. The
design assumes that the results of the gcd calculation are available.
Implementating Hyperelliptic Curve 70
A1*A2
A'
poly_
prod
A1
A2
poly_
squa
d d2
A1
A2
B1
B2
f
s1
s2
s3
d
B1
poly_
prod
poly_
sum
B1*B2
f
(B1B2
+ f)
s3
sum
d
B'
poly_
prod
poly_
prod
poly_quot
poly_
prod
poly_
prod
poly_
3sum
poly_
invers
A'
poly_quot
poly_
prod
poly_
prodd-1mod a
sum*d-1
mod a
s3(B1B2+f)
s1*A1
s2*A2
s2 * A2 * B1
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Figure 6.6: Block diagram of the calculation of A0(u) and B0(u) in parallel
6.1.2 Implementation of the Reduction Step
We implemented the Gauss reduction as described in Algorithm 2.6.3. The design
can be seen in Figure 6.7.
Remark: Figure 6.7 shows only the iteration steps that have to be done in
order to reduce the degree of the polynomials a(u) and b(u). The gure does not
show the steps needed to get a monic polynomial.
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IF
deg A' > g
poly_
prod
poly_
squa
poly_3add
poly_
quot
poly_
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poly_
quot
f
B'2 B'*h
B' h
A'
(f - B'*h - B'2)
A'
(-h -B')
B'
D = (A', B')
D = (A, B)
Figure 6.7: Block diagram of the design of the Gauss Reduction Algorithm
6.2 Implementation of the Doubling Operation
The design of the doubling operation is much easier than that of the addition. When
a = a1 = a2 and b = b1 = b2, we can take s2 = 0, where a1; a2; b1; b2 are the input
polynomials (see Algorithm 2.6.2). Moreover, in the case of characteristic 2 and
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h(u) = 1, we can assume d1 = 1, s1 = s2 = 0, and s3 = 1. Therefore, a doubling of a
divisor in J(F 2m) on a curve of the form v2 + v = f(u) can be simplied as shown in
Algorithm 6.2.1 and Figure 6.8.
Algorithm 6.2.1
Input: Reduced divisors D = div(a; b) dened over F 2n .
Output: A semi-reduced divisor D0 = div(a0; b0) dened over F 2n such that D0  2D.
1. Set a0 = a21
2. b0 = b21 + f (mod a
0)
Remark: This doubling algorithm can only be used for hyperelliptic curves
of the form v2 + v = f(u).
We see that the critical path of the doubling design is one clock cycle for the
squaring and the polynomial addition, plus the calculation of one polynomial division.
In order to do the reduction after the doubling we use the same method as for
the addition, described in Section 6.1.2.
6.3 Results
We chose VHDL as the language to describe the design of the arithmetic needed for
the group operations on the hyperelliptic curve. We completely implemented both
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poly_
add
poly_
quot
A
B2
f
 A2
B
B2 + f
A' B'
Figure 6.8: Block diagram of doubling
group operations, i.e. addition and doubling, on HEC, in VHDL. The VHDL design
was simulated and the correctness of the operation was veried. Certain arithmetic
modules were also synthesized leading to timing and area estimates. However, exact
results are not available at the time of writing.
We chose to implement the hyperelliptic curve C: v2 +v = f(u), where f(u) =
u9 + u7 + u3 + 1. We operated on the polynomial ring F 241 [u]. For the eld F 241 we
chose a polynomial basis with the irreducible polynomial P (x) = x41 + x20 + 1.
The number of elements in the Jacobian group that we chose factors into two primes:
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#J = 11  212581615244041340661452662120917241919480417187 [SS98].
The largest prime factor has 161 bits. We created ten test input and output vectors
with the method described in Section 5.2 to be able to verify the designs for addition
and doubling. We chose a digitsize of four for the eld multiplication.
The timing and area results for the eld arithmetic can be seen in Table
6.1. We can achieve relatively high clock frequencies for all modules except for the
inverter (we have to further optimize the inverter). Even for the polynomial scalar
multiplier, which calculates the product of a eld element and a polynomial with
fourteen coecients, we are able to clock at almost 100 MHz; and we can perform
this operation in only eleven clock cycles.
Table 6.2 shows the number of clock cycles that we achieved with our VHDL
design. We conclude from this table that the polynomial operations addition, squar-
ing, and scalar multiplication are very inexpensive. The most time consuming op-
eration is the calculation of the gcd and the division of two polynomials. Even the
multiplication is far less time critical. We obtained an average cycle count of 2353.5
for the group operation addition and 1426 for the group operation doubling. This
means, if we estimate a clock frequency after mapping of 20 MHz (at the time of pub-
lication nal results where not available), the group addition will take approximately
118s and the doubling approximately 71s.
With the results achieved above, we can estimate the time needed for divisor
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F 241 , P (x) = u9 + u7 + u3 + 1
eld arithmetic
modules frequency average area
MHz clock count
eld adder 162 1 41 (LUTs)
eld squarer 211.9 1 30 (Cells)
eld multiplier
(digitsize = 4) 146 11 227 (LUTs)
inverter 13 198.5 1903 (Cells)
polynomial scalar multiplier
(polynomial degree = 13) 96.9 11 2998 (LUTs)
Table 6.1: Timing results for eld modules after synthesizing
C : v2 + v = u9 + u7 + u3 + 1, F 241
polynomial and group arithmetic
modules average
clock count
polynomial adder 1
polynomial squarer 1
polynomial
scalar multiplier 11
polynomial multiplier
(digitsize = 4) 64.6
polynomial divider 246
polynomial gcd /inverter 359.8
group addition 2353.5
group doubling 1426
Table 6.2: Clock cycle counts of VHDL modules
multiplication. This is computing kD, where k is an integer and D is a Divisor. The
most straightforward algorithm for the divisor multiplication is the left-to-right binary
method [BSS99]. This algorithm requires m doublings and m=2 additions on average,
where m = log2k and k approximates the order of the group. There are a variety of
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algorithms that improve scalar multiplication. One of the most ecient algorithm is
the Window NAF [BSS99]. We need m doublings and the average density of non-zero
coecients is m=(w+1), where w is the window size. We also need to perform (w−1)
additions for the precomputation. Therefore, we need m=(w+ 1) + (w− 1) additions
on average. The results of the estimation are shown in Table 6.3.
C : v2 + v = u9 + u7 + u3 + 1, F 241
# of doubling # of addition time (msec)
Binary 161 80.5 24:7
Window NAF 161 34.5 21:4
Table 6.3: Estimated timing results for divisor multiplication, assuming a hypotheti-
cal clock frequency of 20MHz
Chapter 7
Discussion
This chapter will summarize the results that were obtained throughout the research
work that culminated in this thesis. A summary of the main results as well as some
recommendations for future research will be provided.
7.1 Conclusions
From a design point of view, FPGAs provide a suitable environment for our imple-
mentation. These devices can accommodate large memory structures and provide
optimized macro cells that improve the speed performance of the system. The ne
grain device architecture allows for synthesis tools to perform optimizations almost
at a gate level resulting in very ecient implementations.
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The concept of recongurable hardware for hyperelliptic curves is very attrac-
tive for various reasons. In particular, we can provide very ecient nite eld arith-
metics for squaring and multiplication, which are optimized for the specic eld order
and irreducible polynomial used. That means, we are not constrained to a specic
eld, but at the same time make use of the advantages of eld-specic architectures.
With the tools and time available, it was possible to simulate and verify all the
modules, but it war not possible to compile, and map the design of the addition and
doubling algorithms on hyperelliptic curves. The main achievements of this research
include:
 Development of suitable algorithms to implement the necessary eld operations
in hardware.
 Development of an architecture for polynomial arithmetic in hardware. In par-
ticular the development of an ecient algorithm for polynomial division and
the calculation of the Extended Euclidean Algorithm in the polynomial ring
was demonstrated.
 VHDL description of all modules.
 Functional verication of all modules.
 Estimated time of 118s for an addition and 71s for a doubling in the Jacobian.
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 The estimated time for performing a scalar multiplication using the left-to-right
binary method is 24:7ms and using the Window NAF method it is 21:4ms.
7.2 Recommendations for Further Research
This thesis concentrated on developing architectures for addition and doubling on
hyperelliptic curves in recongurable hardware. To our knowledge, this approach has
not been attempted before. This section will provide the reader with an overview of
the possible areas in which further work could be pursued. The presented ideas came
up as a result of the research and implementation that was done. These recommenda-
tions provide opportunities to investigate further the possibilities of the design that
was developed.
Place and Route: The created netlist has to be placed and routed for the Xilinx
FPGA. After nishing this processes, we would be able to exactly determine
the speed and the number of CLBs used on the recongurable hardware.
Implementation of Lagrange Reduction: We implemented the reduction algo-
rithm proposed by Gauss. This algorithm involves one multiplication and one
division of high degree polynomials per iteration of reducing the two polyno-
mials. The algorithm is not optimal, because each iteration is independent of
the previous one. However, we could use information from the previous step
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to speed up the reduction. Lagrange reduction takes advantage of this fact. A
generalized version for arbitrary characteristic was given by Enge in [Eng99].
A project would be to implement the Lagrange reduction and compare the two
implementations of the reduction algorithms.
Dierent Curve Parameters: The VHDL code was optimized for the use of a
special curve and eld. In a future project, one could test the consequences in
terms of timing and area used, that result from using dierent curves, elds,
and genera.
Acceleration of gcd Implementation: One of the bottlenecks of the addition on
a hyperelliptic curve is the calculation of the gcd of three polynomials over a
polynomial ring. Further research could lead to a more ecient way to imple-
ment the calculation of the gcd. One possibility would be to look into the gcd
calculation with lattices [Knu98].
Implementation of Inversion: In [IT88], the authors proposed a way to compute
multiplicative inverses in GF (2m) using normal bases. They perform an inver-
sion with at most 2[log2(m− 1)] multiplications in GF (2m) and (m− 1) cyclic
shifts, which can be less than those required in the Extended Euclidean Algo-
rithm. In this way we could speed up our implementation, because we need the
inversion in various modules.
Time-Area Complexity Tradeo: We implemented a digit-serial type eld mul-
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tiplier in this thesis. Thus we have an easy way to increase or decrease the
speed/area of the eld multiplier. If we choose a high digit-size for the multi-
plier, we have a highly parallelized multiplier. This means we achieve a high
speed, but the drawback is the larger area needed. Whereas if we choose a
small digit-size we get a multiplier that is almost serial. Finding the optimum
conguration is an open problem.
Hyperelliptic Processor: Hardware oers greater physical security than software
implementations. For example, we have a better protection of the private key
and a better protection against algorithm manipulation. But we can use such
advantages only if we implement a stand-alone processor. Otherwise, there
could be security holes, e.g. while passing keys. A possible project could be a
realization of a hyperelliptic processor. Our implementation could be used as
the core of this processor.
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